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Naim v. Naim1 is famous as the case that never was. In it, the Supreme
Court declined, in 1955, to accept review of a case that would have enabled it
to set aside a Virginia law forbidding interracial marriage.2 At the time, many
states had on the books similar laws, which were beginning to come under
challenge, and ruling them illegal would seem to have been a straightforward
application of Brown v. Board of Education.3 After all, if school segregation is
unconstitutional, separating the races on the marriage altar would appear to be
so as well.
Federal courts were striking down discriminatory laws and practices in a
host of settings, ranging from segregated buses4 to golf courses,5 public
beaches, bathhouses, and swimming pools,6 while Congress was enacting legis-
lation banning discrimination in housing, employment, and voting.7 Even then
it was clear that Brown marked a turning point in the nation’s history,
unleashing forces that would lead to the civil rights era of the sixties and
seventies.8
Yet in June 1955, the Court declined to review a law providing for one of
the most galling and discriminatory of practices, the prohibition of marriages
between blacks and whites, one that signaled black inferiority as plainly and
unmistakably as any other. For if whites and nonwhites cannot marry and make
lives together, what does it matter if they can attend the same movie theater or
swim in the same public pool? The prohibition of intermarriage would seem to
violate Brown’s mandate as glaringly as any other.
* University Professor of Law, Seattle University. J.D., U.C.-Berkeley, 1974. Thanks to
Jean Stefancic for her comments and suggestions.
1 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955),
aff’d, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1955), motion to recall mandate denied and appeal dismissed, 350
U.S. 985 (1956).
2 It did so on the basis of a procedural technicality that it could easily have circumvented.
See id; see also Jackson v. Alabama, 348 U.S. 888 (1954) (Court denied certiorari in a
similar case arising from a different Southern state).
3 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
5 Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
6 Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
7 See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 710 (2004) (“Brown
helped galvanize the political coalition that secured passage of historic legislation banning
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, voting, and housing.”); see also
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994).
8 On this period, see, e.g., JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES
FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 163–71 (2d ed. 2007).
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One common explanation for the Court’s inaction is that it believed that
“[o]ne bombshell at a time is enough.”9 Attributed to Justice Clark, the remark
suggests that the Court believed that Brown v. Board of Education had
inflamed public opinion, particularly in the South, sufficiently that a further
decision in a sensitive area such as marriage would have eroded the Court’s
legitimacy.10 With long entrenched social practices, such as miscegenation,
gradualism is often in order.11 When the Court gets out ahead of the times,
these commentators suggest, the result always disappoints.
For these incrementalists, Roe v. Wade12 is a prime example of a decision
that came too soon. In 1973, the movement for women’s procreative liberties
was still at an early stage. The public discussion of abortion was not complete.
The country was not ready for a sweeping decision, so it should come as no
surprise that subsequent courts predictably cut back the newly protected right,
while a vigorous pro-life movement sprang up to challenge it. As a result,
women today enjoy a degree of procreative freedom scarcely higher, in real
terms, than that which they enjoyed in 1973.
By the same token, the Court was correct in waiting nearly thirteen years
after Brown to rule, finally, in Loving v. Virginia,13 that anti-miscegenation
laws were unconstitutional.14 By then, the civil rights movement was in full
force and had been so for the better part of a decade.15 Protesters had sat in at
restaurants, bus stations, and lunch counters.16 Martin Luther King had led
mass marches and delivered a series of stirring speeches.17 Federal troops and
intrepid students had integrated formerly all-white colleges and universities.18
Chicano students had staged walk-outs at public high schools in Los Angeles
and Denver.19 The American Indian Movement was stirring.20
By 1967, the Supreme Court could safely rule, in Loving v. Virginia, that a
statute aimed at maintaining the genetic purity of the white race was legally
intolerable. In the same state, Virginia, where the Naim couple had received
short shrift twelve years earlier, the Supreme Court could declare that a regime
of racial separation in the institution of marriage was unconstitutional.21
9 See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964).
10 See LUCAS POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 71–73 (2000).
11 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 321 (2004) (discussing this prudential
position); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOC-
UMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 127–39 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, If Peo-
ple Would be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155
(2007) (positing that it may be legitimate for judges, at times, to consider the likelihood of a
public backlash to their rulings).
12 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14 Id. at 12.
15 See PEREA ET AL., supra note 8, at 163–71 (describing this era).
16 See generally id.
17 See id. at 168–70.
18 See generally id. at 163–68.
19 See generally id. at 329–33.
20 See id. at 227–39.
21 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Was Naim v. Naim correctly decided, then? Was the Supreme Court wise
and prudent in denying review and requiring interracial couples to wait a dozen
years before being able to marry legally? Naim and Loving are very similar on
the facts.22 It would seem as though the commentators are correct in observing
that the main reason why the Court waited so long was that it feared the conse-
quences of a second major decision—a second bombshell—coming on the
heels of Brown.
But was delay sensible and wise? In the remainder of this Essay I argue,
contrary to the usual view, that it was not. The Court may have managed to
preserve its own dignity and the appearance of being above the fray.23 But
ponder what society and many individual couples lost in return.
During those twelve years, in many states mixed-race couples, their rela-
tionship forged most likely on a picket line, a civil rights march, or other such
event, could not marry. If they were a devoted couple, they would be forced to
live together without the benefit of marriage, to conceal their relationship from
others much of the time, and, probably, refrain from having children.24
They were not the only ones to lose out. Society did, as well. It missed the
opportunity to see twelve years worth of mixed-race couples and their children
at schools, on sidewalks, in markets, and in the many ordinary interactions of
life. It lost the opportunity, multiplied many times, to see how normal interra-
cial friendship can be.25
The costs included doctrinal setbacks as well. Deprived of a ruling that
could have clarified the breadth and scope of the Equal Protection Clause, the
civil rights movement was forced to proceed piecemeal.26 Legal progress came
more slowly than it would have had the Court clarified early on that equality
meant that the races stood on the same footing with respect to the deepest form
of interpersonal commitment.
Finally, the delay produced an unintended effect. The Southern resistance
movement could fool itself into believing, for a crucial thirteen years (the inter-
val from Brown to Loving), that, no matter what Congress and the lower courts
were saying about registering to vote or taking a swim in a public pool, at least
they were safe against the ultimate indignity—seeing their daughters and those
of their friends linked in marriage to black men.27 Because the Supreme Court
did not spell out early on that their defeat would eventually be total, white
southerners fought on, litigating first the right to ride a city bus, then the inte-
22 Both turned on the constitutionality of state laws forbidding marriages between whites
and members of certain nonwhite races.
23 See generally Sunstein, supra note 11; KLARMAN, supra note 11.
24
“Living together” was not as acceptable an option then as it is today.
25 The social-contact theory holds that experiences such as these are powerful ways of coun-
tering stereotypes and reducing the amount of racism in society. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALL-
PORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 252–60 (1958).
26 That is, first school integration in colleges and universities; then the lower grades; then in
Latino schools; then in swimming pools and bus terminals. See supra notes 4–8 and accom-
panying text.
27 Occasionally, a Southern white man would seek to marry a black woman. But these cases
were much rarer and less feared than the opposite combination.
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gration of swimming pools, then county hospitals, giving ground as slowly as
possible.28
Resisters learned an important lesson. Hold on as long as possible, and the
opposition will tire. And, eventually it did. Weary of raucous protests, long-
haired students, and singing and chanting, the country, by the early seventies,
was ready for business as usual. Civil rights organizations like the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) and the Mexi-
can American Legal Defense and Education Fund (“MALDEF”) soldiered on,
of course. But increasingly they played to empty houses.29
Moreover, when Loving v. Virginia arrived, it ended up meaning less than
it would have had it come at an earlier point during the civil rights decade. In
1954 or 1955, a Supreme Court decision setting aside laws against interracial
marriage would have electrified the country. It would have seemed logical and
right. It would have enabled the United States to seize the moral high ground in
the fight for human freedom.30 The country would have reaped even more of
the Cold War gains that accrued when the Supreme Court handed down
Brown.31
But by the time Virginia v. Loving came down, interracial marriage was
practically a moderate practice, even a conservative one.32 By then, Black
Power had appeared on the scene.33 The Brown Beret movement was leading
Latinos toward brown nationalism.34 Blacks in civil rights organizations were
beginning to insist that whites cede leadership.35 Stokely Carmichael was
warning that movements like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(“SNCC”) might not remain nonviolent much longer.36
Students were marching in the streets.37 The Black Panther Party was
beginning to carry guns and speak of black self-determination.38 Now, a black
man and a white woman finding true love in each other’s company and decid-
ing to spend their lives together sent a message that mainstream society must
28 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 45–71 (1991) (describing Southern resistance to desegregation mandates).
29 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 54–56 (6th ed. 2008).
30 How much better than the “all deliberate speed” mandate of Brown II. See Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“Brown II,” ordering that desegregation proceed at a
measured pace).
31 See generally MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (documenting role of establishment figures in inducing the
Supreme Court to hand down a decision in favor of blacks in order to burnish the country’s
international appearance and increase its credibility with uncommitted nations in the struggle
against world Communism).
32 I do not mean that it was popular with the American public. It was not, and still is not
today. I mean, rather, that it carried a different connotation. See text and notes immediately
infra.
33 See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 8, at 1211.
34 See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY L ´OPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 20
(2003) (describing this early activist period).
35 See PEREA ET AL., supra note 8, at 170 (describing this nationalist period).
36 See id. at 170, 1211–12.
37 See id. at 168–71, 1203–12.
38 See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1789–90 (1992).
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have found comforting—a return to the old ways.39 Formerly anathema to an
entire region,40 interracial love and romance now emerged as a relatively tame,
even conventional act. Marriage across racial lines signaled the hope that the
races could put aside their disagreements and histories and be friends. Like
lions and lambs lying down together, their union symbolized peace, which was
what America then wanted and longed for.
The Supreme Court could now legalize interracial marriage secure that it
would evoke little protest. The second bombshell was so long in arriving that,
when it did, the world heard little more than a slight bang.41
More significantly, when the Supreme Court, in 1967, permitted Mildred
Jeter and Richard Perry Loving to live as a married couple in Virginia, it sig-
naled the beginning of a new direction. Colorblind jurisprudence would be the
new talisman, marking the start of a long, slow slide with opinions like Bakke
v. University of California,42 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,43 and People
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number One44 usher-
ing in an era of indifference toward race-based claims and a redefinition of
“equality” to mean the formalistic refusal to consider race even for remedial
purposes.
Although Loving contains language condemning white supremacy,45 it
betrays a calculated note, as though the authors knew that it was coming too
late to do much good.46 Its result would have been radical, surprising, and
brave in the mid nineteen-fifties. By 1967, it was practically passe´. Indeed, it
may have laid the basis for a new philosophy that would soon be turned against
blacks and Latinos and used to limit affirmative action and redress for
discrimination.47
39 That is, to the early days of the civil rights movement, when marches were peaceful,
orderly, and decorous, and sit-ins were prayerful, with the participants wearing suits and ties
and singing songs of peace and brotherhood.
40 That is, the South.
41 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (observing that at least one Supreme Court
justice agreed with the decision to evade review of Naim v. Naim on this ground).
42 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down a University
of California affirmative action plan that reserved a small number of seats for minority
applicants).
43 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that “all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”).
44 Parents Involved in Cmty Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 723–35 (2007)
(holding school district’s use of racial classification in student assignment plans could not be
justified by declared compelling interest of diversity in higher education when the district
failed to show that “they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to
achieve their stated goals”).
45 For example, “that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 12, 14 (1967).
46 For example: “Over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated ‘[d]istinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry’”—scarcely thundering language and citing
as support two Japanese internment cases, both of which found such a distinction fully justi-
fied during times of national security threat. Id.
47 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (describing the shift to colorblind jurispru-
dence). Loving may have marked the beginning of this trend since it turned on the notion of
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Throughout civil rights history, this has been the fate of a succession of
brave doctrines and mottoes. In “ideological drift,”48 what might have been
surprising and emancipatory in one era often finds itself put to entirely different
use in a later one.49 Conservatives are fond of quoting Martin Luther King’s
famous lines about judging persons by the content of their character, not the
color of their skin. But they do so not to deplore racism, segregated neighbor-
hoods, unequal school funding, or to rally support for ethnic-studies courses,
departments, and programs. Rather, they deploy the phrase to argue against
affirmative action and other race-conscious remedies.50
Similarly, intermarriage today is not the powerful force it might have been
in 1955. Instead, it serves interests that are decidedly self-centered and techno-
cratic. A multiracial movement, consisting largely of white mothers who bore
children with black or Latino fathers, is clamoring for recognition and a sepa-
rate census category, much to the chagrin of the black and Latino communities,
which need their numbers.51 Many college applicants with little connection to
communities of color discover their ancestry on the eve of submitting their
college applications. These “box checkers”52 often receive special considera-
tion at elite schools in preference to applicants with longstanding minority
ties.53 At some elite colleges and universities, the number of foreign-born—
usually African, Caribbean, or Latin American-born—and mixed-race minority
students exceeds the number of those with long roots in America.54
Suppose that a major Supreme Court decision invalidating laws against
intermarriage had arrived in the mid-fifties, just as the civil rights movement
was gathering force. Might not a courageous judicial decision attacking one of
the strongholds of Southern resistance have provided the movement and the
momentum it needed to accomplish lasting gains?55 The population, the faces
one sees in America today, and the color of its leaders might today be radically
different.56 A president like Barack Obama might have arrived earlier.57 The
inevitable right-wing backlash might have been less ferocious and less able to
equal treatment: couples of like and unlike race received the same treatment under applicable
law.
48 See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
870–71 (1993) (describing the process by which liberal ideas can, over time, take on con-
servative overtones).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 111–25 (2000).
51 See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 8, at 85–86, 91–92, 811, 969–72.
52 On box-checking, see, e.g., John Martinez, Trivializing Diversity: The Problem of Over-
inclusion in Affirmative Action Programs, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 49, 49 (1995);
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1156,
1215 (2007).
53 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 52, at 1156.
54 See Darryl Fears, In Diversity Push, Top Universities Enrolling More Black Immigrants:
Critics Say Effort Favors Elite Foreigners, Leaves Out Americans, WASH. POST, March 6,
2007, at A02.
55 See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 28.
56 That is, the faces one sees in the course of the day would be different, with more color,
more mixing, and more individuals of indeterminate or mixed ethnicity.
57 Obama became the nation’s first black president a full 54 years after Brown.
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tap middle-class indignation. In short, we might be a different nation if the
Supreme Court had been less concerned about appearances and more about
doing the right thing in 1955.
Naim v. Naim, then, was not a prudent exercise in judicial discretion but a
timid act that misjudged the times. Emanating from a court that ought to be in
the business of articulating social and legal values—and not waiting until it is
safe or convenient to do so—it was a jurisprudential error comparable in some
ways to Brown II.58
58 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering that desegregation
proceed at all deliberate speed).
